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FAMILY LAW FOR THE UNDERCLASS:  UNDERSCORING
LAW’S IDEOLOGICAL FUNCTION
DAVID RAY PAPKE*
It is challenging to discuss the relationship of socioeconomic class to family
law and to the law in general.  Against the backdrop of a dominant culture that
valorizes individualism, traditional American legal thought has routinely
assumed significant degrees of choice and volition and called for laws and legal
processes able to accommodate free-willed decisionmaking.  “[I]f there is a
single leitmotif of modern law, whether civil rights law, commercial law, family
law, or the law of landlord and tenant,” the legal historian Lawrence Friedman
observed, “it is an extreme emphasis on the individual, and on individual choice
or consent; the whole system turns on this point.”   In the contemporary legal1
academy, those interdisciplinary and theoretical approaches most receptive to
presumptions of individual choice, for example, “law and economics,” have been
more likely to thrive than approaches that rely on class or even gender.2
Champions of “law and economics” enthusiastically contemplate the workings
of markets, both real and imaginary, often formulaically conjuring up the image
of individual maximizers of self-interest.
In scholarship speaking of socioeconomic class, by contrast, the individual
ceases to be the leitmotif and questions of the individual’s self-maximizing
choices leave center-stage.  Differences among individuals are of course
recognized, but the focal point for commentary and analysis is more social and
collective.  The underlying assumption is that class affiliation strongly affects
one’s choices in life and also one’s interaction with the law and legal processes.
Surely that is the case for members of the underclass.  In the contemporary
United States, 10-12% of the adult population belongs to a sub-working class.3
This underclass is disproportionately African American, but it also includes
Latinos, Native Americans, and Caucasians.  The Caucasian members of the
underclass, Christopher Jencks reminds us, can be easily overlooked.   Caucasian4
584 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:583
UNDERCLASS 145 (1992). 
5. See id.
6. See Richard Delgado, The Myth of Upward Mobility, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 879, 900-01
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members of the underclass make up only a small percentage of the whole
Caucasian population and infrequently constitute a majority in a residential
neighborhood, but non-Caucasian members of the underclass make up substantial
percentages of minority populations and more frequently constitute majorities in
given neighborhoods.    Regardless of race and ethnicity, members of the5
underclass receive or have received welfare in the past.  They lack regular
employment or have dropped completely out of the labor market.  Underclass
Americans frequently lead lives of semi-permanent poverty and debilitating
transience, and if they experience any degree of “upward mobility,” it is
commonly to only the lower rungs of the working class.6
After an initial section outlining in more detail my understanding of class,
the underclass, and ideology, this Article focuses on the relationship of the
underclass and family law.  The second section explores the underclass’s
relationship to marriage law, emphasizing programs to get the underclass to
marry.  The third section addresses issues of child support, critically examining
the range of state and federal laws designed to extract support from delinquent
payors, a large percentage of whom belong to the underclass.  The final section
of the Article turns to adoption, and it highlights the role of underclass women
as “suppliers” in adoption and the ways legal standards and procedures strongly
favor adoptive parents over biological ones.
Family law in these areas functions more or less successfully to support
social institutions thought to be desirable, to enforce individual obligations and
responsibilities, and to foster the well-being of children.  However, family law
for the underclass additionally assumes a distinctly ideological function.  In
particular, it condemns the underclass.  This ideological stance is evident in
selected family law statutes and appellate opinions, and it also emerges in the
policy thinking and political preferences that buoy the statutes and opinions.
Family law as ideology also intersects with other varieties of ideology in the form
of religious sermons, political rhetoric, and even popular culture such as movies
and television programming.  The ideology suggests the underclass does not
comport itself with the norms of the middle and upper classes and, therefore,
lives its collective life improperly.
I.  AN INTRODUCTION TO CLASS ANALYSIS AND THE
NOTION OF AN “UNDERCLASS”
Even a casual observer would recognize that a class analysis has traditionally
been suspect in American legal and political discourse.  The chief reason for the
suspicion is the linkage of class analysis to Marxism and to Communism.
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Indeed, Karl Marx and his collaborator Friedrich Engels claimed in the
Communist Manifesto that “The history of all hitherto existing society is the
history of class struggles.”   Marx and Engels also asserted that class was a7
uniquely prominent feature of any capitalist society.   They did not have the8
United States primarily in mind, but if Marx and Engels were alive today, they
would recognize the United States as the world’s leading capitalist country and
presumably be inclined to underscore its immense class-based inequalities.
However, there is no reason that a law-related class analysis need be
Marxian.  Other social theorists and sociologists have discussed and critiqued
socioeconomic class for almost two centuries, and many have not divided modern
society into two great classes—the proletariat and the bourgeoisie—as Marx did.
Different societies and different epochs have different class structures.  In the
contemporary United States, the white-collar middle class is larger than the
traditional blue-collar class of manual workers, and scholars have even suggested
that the burgeoning middle class is the key to the American economy.   “[I]t is9
misleading in itself to treat white-collar labor as an undifferentiated category, and
the overall expansion of the white-collar sector in capitalist societies conceals
differential rates of growth in various occupational subcategories.”10
Furthermore, middle-class subcategories are themselves hierarchically arranged.
One might rank the major subcategories of the white-collar middle class in order
as follows:  professional and managerial workers, small businessmen, technical
and support workers, and clericals.  Clericals have experienced a relative loss of
income and status within the white-collar middle class, and some clericals now
have less job security than members of the ever-shrinking blue-collar working
class.11
Class structures are not only variable among societies and across time but are
also permeable and shifting.  Depending on the nature and rigidity of the class
structure, some number of individuals might move from one class to another.
Often these individuals are temporarily accommodated by intermediate and
transitional strata, for example, upwardly mobile student populations.  In some
cases whole occupations assume new locations in the overall class structure.
Secretaries, for example, had higher social standing a century ago than they do
today.   Class systems are dynamic, both for individuals and groups.12
In general, a class in a capitalist society is a group of people with comparable
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assets, employment, and market relations.   Members of a class can anticipate13
similar overall societal standing and remuneration.  One’s class affiliation is an
important factor in one’s living conditions, life experiences, and economic
opportunities.
Such opportunities are limited for members of the “underclass,” a second
stopping point in this introductory discussion.  European social critics reaching
back to Marx have commented on this social configuration,  but the notion of14
an underclass seems to have truly caught hold in the United States in the 1970s.
In particular, American journalists began to write about the underclass.  A
featured article published in Time in 1977 included pictures of drug-users, defiant
young men, pregnant teenagers, and children playing on dirty streets—virtually
displaying the underclass as if it was in a museum or a zoo.   The article15
described the underclass’s social environment as “a different world, a place of
pock-marked streets, gutted tenements and broken hopes.”   The underclass, the16
article continued, was “a large group of people who are more intractable, more
socially alien and more hostile than almost anyone imagined.”17
Similar articles continued to appear throughout the 1980s, and some fed into
the inclination of conservative politicians to criticize inner-city Americans for
their laziness and social pathology.  In a 1987 Fortune article, America’s
Underclass:  What to Do?, Myron Magnet argued underclass Americans were
recognizable through “not so much their poverty or race as their behavior—the
chronic lawlessness, drug use, out-of-wedlock births, nonwork, welfare
dependency, and school failure.”   “‘Underclass’ describes a state of mind and18
a way of life,” Magnet asserted.  “It is at least as much a cultural as an economic
condition.”   Magnet then employed a “law and economics” analysis:19
Economists have a vision of man as a rational calculator, scurrying
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among available options maximizing gain, driven hither and yon by this
incentive or that disincentive.  This way of thinking, to be sure, has a
real usefulness in grappling with the underclass problem.  Where
incentives for failure exist—welfare and the unwillingness to punish
criminals are the luminous two cases in point—then of course the
community has to change the calculus.20
Troubled by the increasingly hostile alignment of this journalism, prominent
contemporary sociologist William Julius Wilson critiqued it sharply.   Wilson21
had earlier attempted to place the American underclass in historical context.22
The American underclass, Wilson thought, was a relatively modern phenomenon
that derived from post-World War II changes in the economy.   In essence, the23
labor market grew increasingly segmented, and access to good jobs and personal
wealth came to depend on educational criteria.   Poorly trained and educated, the24
underclass constituted “the very bottom of the economic hierarchy and not only
includes those lower-class workers whose income falls below the poverty level
but also the more or less permanent welfare recipients, the long-term
unemployed, and those who have dropped out of the labor market.”25
Wilson has backed off the term “underclass” in his own scholarship, fearing
that it is a convenient tool for those who want to speak of the sub-working class
pejoratively and to condemn it for its misconduct.   Wilson’s fears about the26
term are understandable, but the term is still useful, if only to denote a class
worse off than the regularly employed working class.
Before abandoning the term “underclass,” Wilson argued that the
fundamental dilemma facing the underclass was “joblessness reinforced by an
increasing social isolation in an impoverished neighborhood.”   In other words,27
beyond merely lacking jobs and legitimate economic opportunities, members of
the underclass, in Wilson’s conceptualization, also lacked community safeguards
and supports.   This is an extremely debilitating situation.  Members of the28
underclass might with good reason experience frustration, boredom, and
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at 141.
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34. See id. at 153.
35. Id. at 152-53.
36. Id. at 153.
alienation.  Additionally, members of the underclass may manifest criminal
behavior and other social pathologies.
From the perspective of the superior working, middle, and upper classes, the
ongoing presence of an underclass is an intractable problem.  In a Marxian
understanding of class relations, there is an “antagonistic interdependence of
material interests of actors within economic relations.”   More specifically, the29
material welfare of the more powerful classes depends on the material
deprivations of the less powerful classes.   The dominant classes appropriate the30
fruits of the labor of the exploited.   “This dependency of the exploiter on the31
exploited gives the exploited a certain [form] of power, since human beings
always retain at least some minimal control over their own expenditure of
effort.”    Exploiters would like the exploited to cooperate, and in order to obtain32
that cooperation, exploiters sometimes moderate their demands.  “Paradoxically
perhaps, exploitation is thus a constraining force on the practices of the exploiter.
This constraint constitutes a basis of power for the exploited.”33
How does one exploit an isolated, debilitated underclass?  Members of the
underclass do not necessarily sell their labor in sustained ways for crucial
purposes, and, as a result, the fruits of their labor cannot be appropriated.   “The34
situation is similar to a capitalist owning outmoded machines.  While the
capitalist physically controls these pieces of machinery, they cease to be
‘capital’—a capitalistically productive asset—if they cannot be deployed within
a capitalist production process profitably.”   Members of the more powerful35
classes do not for the most part become angry with their outmoded machinery,
but they do sometimes grow irritated with the underclass:
The material interests of the wealthy and privileged segments of
American society would be better served if these people simply
disappeared.  However, unlike in the nineteenth century, the moral and
political forces are such that direct genocide is no longer a viable
strategy.  The alternative, then, is to build prisons and to cordon off the
zones of cities in which the underclass lives.36
Short of incarceration and residential segregation, the middle and upper
classes can exercise some degree of control over the underclass through its
rhetoric.  If the underclass cannot truly be changed, at least its members can be
criticized, deplored, and set clearly outside the mainstream.  Pronouncements of
this sort are ideological, “ideology” standing not for falsehood but rather the
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normative ideas and attitudes of a given social group or coalition of groups.37
“Ideologues” who would denigrate the underclass could speak not only through
conventional political speeches and writings but also through law, religion,
philosophy, and even aesthetics.   In the contemporary setting, as a later section38
of this Article will illustrate, popular culture in the form of movies and television
programming also sometimes ridicules and condemns the underclass.   
Often, the underclass is in a poor position to complain.  Modern-day
American “welfare reform” glorifies wage relations in a market economy, but
members of the underclass, lacking strong wage relations, cannot for the most
part effectively complain to employers.  In the political arena, members of the
underclass are severely alienated and often do not make their way to the polls.
This reduces their leverage with politicians and elected officials.  Overall, a
striking degree of economic and political powerlessness is evident within the
underclass, and the underclass is a sector of society especially vulnerable to the
buffeting of ideology.
II.  MARRIAGE LAW
Although annulments, ante-nuptial agreements, and the possibility of same-
sex unions are important for members of the middle and upper classes, these
mainstream marriage law concerns have appreciably less urgency for the
underclass.  The chief reason is that members of the underclass do not seek to
marry or actually marry as frequently as members of the middle and upper
classes.   During most of the twentieth century Americans of all classes married39
at roughly the same rate,  but the incidence of decline of underclass marriage40
began to manifest in the 1970s.   By the end of the 1980s, poor women were41
only three-quarters as likely to marry as middle and upper-class women.   In the42
two decades since, the contrast has grown even more striking, and as of 2005
poor men and women were only one-half as likely to marry as men and women
with incomes at least three times the poverty level.   Variations exist according43
to region, ethnicity, and race, but “[t]he emerging gulf is instead one of
class—what demographers, sociologists, and those who study the often
depressing statistics about the wedded state call a ‘marriage gap’ between the
well-off and the less so.”   Law as a social instrument and as a refined44
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53. Christina M. Gibson-Davis, Kathryn Edin & Sara McLanahan, High Hopes but Even
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& FAM. 1301 (2005). 
ideological pronouncement would like to narrow the gap.
Why are members of the contemporary underclass less likely to marry?
Some religious, pro-family groups point to the underclass’s lack of respect for the
sacred institution of marriage and to the underclass’s general moral disarray, but
scholars point to less normative and more substantive factors.  As early as 1981,
for example, the scholar Gary S. Becker argued forcefully that with women’s
entry into the labor force and rise in income relative to men’s income, women no
longer needed to marry and could remain single if they wished.   Underclass45
women, in particular, are more likely to be employed than underclass men, and
even their border-line financial independence makes it more likely that they will
live their lives without husbands.   William Julius Wilson, by contrast, pointed46
primarily to the declining number of “marriageable” men in the inner-city.   He47
argues that “the sharp increase in black male joblessness since 1970 accounts in
large measure for the rise in the rate of single-parent families, and that because
jobless rates are highest in the inner-city ghetto, rates of single parenthood are
also highest there.”   Wilson’s theory is that, against the backdrop of48
deindustrialization, inner-city men have declining or non-existent wages, and
inner-city women have less interest in drawing from the pool of potential
husbands.   Kathryn Edin and Maria Kefalas add that a culture-wide redefinition49
of marriage has occurred since the 1950s.   The standards for marriage have50
risen, and sex and childbearing have been decoupled from marriage.   Members51
of the underclass share these new attitudes with members of the middle and
upper classes, but the difference is that members of the underclass are less likely
to reach what Edin and Kefalas call the “white picket fence dream.”52
Edin also participated in a particularly thoughtful recent study of the
underclass’s low marriage rates with Christina M. Gibson-Davis and Sara
McLanahan.   These scholars began with data from the Fragile Families and53
Child Well-being Study, a nationally representative study of 3700 unmarried
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couples with newborns and a comparison sample of 1200 married couples with
newborns.   They then extended the data with their Time, Love, Cash, Caring54
and Children Study, an embedded, qualitative, interview-based study of forty-
nine “fragile families” and twenty-six married couples.   The “fragile family”55
sample was limited to English-speaking parents whose household incomes were
less that $30,000 or who used Medicaid to pay for the birth of their children.56
The core sample, in other words, consisted largely of unmarried underclass men
and women who had recently become parents.
Gibson-Davis, Edin, and McLanahan concluded that financial stability was
by far the most common barrier to marriage.   The overwhelming number of57
interviewees said they wanted to get their finances in order before getting
married.   This included the ability to regularly make ends meet, the acquisition58
of suitable semi-permanent assets, the development of prudent asset-management
skills, and the accumulation of enough savings to have a proper wedding.   The59
latter goal, although not necessarily the key financial concern, intriguingly
suggests that while members of the underclass may not marry as frequently as
members of the more prosperous classes, members of the underclass do believe
in marriage and consider it an important and desirable undertaking.  Members of
the underclass could modestly and inexpensively marry before magistrates and
justices of the peace, but most want something fancier and more expensive.60
“Though these expectations may seem impractical,” Gibson-Davis, Edin, and
McLanahan say, “we believe that they reflect the idea among low-income parents
that getting married should signal that the couple has ‘arrived’ in a financial
sense.”61
Underclass couples also cited the quality of relationships and the
undesirability of divorce as barriers of sorts to marriage.   Unmarried couples62
frequently say they want to know more about one another and whether their
relationship is strong enough before committing to marriage.   The articulation63
of terms for marriage dissolution in an ante-nuptial agreement is not an issue
because most underclass couples do not think marriage should be a short-term
matter.   In a related vein, many members of the underclass believe that “divorce64
ought not to be an option.”   Jokes about “starter marriages” do not play as well65
with unmarried underclass couples as they do with members of the middle and
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upper classes.
This is not to say that law related to marriage has no relevance to members
of the underclass.  Annulments, ante-nuptial agreements, and the substantive and
procedural laws of marriage are of lesser importance to the underclass, but
members of the underclass might be aware of the marriage promotion laws that
have been enacted in recent years.  The religious and fiscal conservatives who
run the programs established under these laws frequently target the underclass.
The marriage promotion programs are examples of family law attempting to
perform a “channeling function,” that is, directing people toward preferred
relationships and institutions.66
The promotion of marriage by governmental officials began in a sense with
the complaints and pronouncements of then Vice President Dan Quayle in
1992.   In a speech to the Commonwealth Club of California, Quayle67
surprisingly cited unwed motherhood as a contributing factor to the riots that
occurred in Los Angeles earlier in the year.   More surprisingly, he even68
criticized the sit-com character Murphy Brown, a fictional news anchorwoman
played by actress Candace Bergen.   Brown wanted to have a baby but also69
remain single.  Quayle complained:  “It doesn’t help matters when prime time TV
has Murphy Brown—a character who supposedly epitomizes today’s intelligent,
highly paid, professional woman—mocking the importance of fathers, by bearing
a child alone and calling it just another ‘lifestyle choice.’”   Instead of delivering70
messages of this sort, Quayle thought, we should be promoting marriage and
teaching Americans how to sustain their marriages.
The liberal media ridiculed Quayle for picking a fight with a fictional
character,  and he and his running mate George H. Bush lost their bid for71
reelection.  Nevertheless, marriage promotion remained available as something
to champion for politicians of many stripes.  In the mid-1990s, for example,
Congress approved and President William Clinton signed into law massive
changes in the welfare system.   A later section of this Article discusses this72
welfare reform at greater length, but relevant at this point are the ways
governmental leaders linked welfare reform to marriage.  The welfare reform
statute itself begins with ten congressional findings, and the first two concern
marriage.  The statute tells us directly that “[m]arriage is the foundation of a
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successful society”  and also that “[m]arriage is an essential institution of a73
successful society which promotes the interests of children.”   This endorsement74
of marriage had obvious appeal for members of pro-family and religious groups
battling in the curious trenches of the culture wars.75
When George W. Bush moved into the White House in 2001, marriage
promotion became one of the ways he could project his preferred image as a
“compassionate conservative.”   Referring back to the “findings” made in76
conjunction with welfare reform, the Bush Administration seized upon marriage
promotion as the next stage of welfare.   Once people had been removed from77
welfare, the argument went, marriage could be a way for former welfare
recipients to become productive members of society and to achieve financial
security.
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 created “The Healthy Marriage Initiative”
and made funding of $150 million available for each of the fiscal years 2006
through 2010 for marriage promotion programs and activities.   What from the78
Bush Administration’s perspective was a “healthy marriage”?  “There are at least
two characteristics that all healthy marriages have in common.  First, they are
mutually enriching, and second, both spouses have a deep respect for each
other.”   “We don’t want to come in with a heavy hand,” said Dr. Wade F. Horn,79
Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services for Children and Families.80
“We want to help couples, especially low-income couples, manage conflict in
healthy ways.”81
The federal “Healthy Marriage Initiative” dovetailed with programs that
preceded it in individual states, and it also led to new ventures.  Oklahoma, for
example, had mounted programs even before the federal initiative, and the so-
called “Oklahoma Marriage Initiative” became the first statewide initiative.   It82
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has used $10 million in federal monies to create a marriage resource center and
to mount youth outreach campaigns, school-based programs, and community
workshops.   Most marriage initiatives are local, but groups and individuals have83
also designed programs such as the Hispanic Healthy Marriage Initiative, the
Native American Healthy Marriage Initiative, and the African American Healthy
Marriage Initiative for members of minority groups regardless of their
residence.   In hopes of promoting marriage among African Americans, the84
African American Marriage Initiative has recalled slaves’ determination to marry
even though antebellum law precluded it.  In some areas, slaves unofficially
married by jumping over a broom.   The modern-day African American85
Marriage Initiative distributes a “Jump the Broom” video as part of its marriage
promotion program.86
Of particular interest for purposes of this Article are marriage promotion
programs specifically designed for the underclass.  Champions of marriage have
realized that programs designed with white, middle-class, well-educated couples
in mind might not work as well for members of the underclass.   Hence, a87
program such as “Loving Couples Loving Children” uses a television “talk show”
format in which couples discuss their relationships in front of a lively audience.88
Fortunately, the tone is closer to “Oprah” than to “Jerry Springer.”  “Love’s
Cradle,” another marriage promotion program designed for the underclass self-
consciously “dumbs down” the presentation.  It pitches to a fifth-grade
educational level,  apparently never stopping to realize how insulting it might89
be to even poorly educated people.
Anticipating criticism, proponents of marriage promotion denied any sinister
motives or agendas.  Wade F. Horn, for example, insisted that assorted marriage
initiatives would not force anyone to get or stay married.   Indeed, it does not90
appear that marriage promotion programs have led many members of the
underclass to marry, even though some of the programs have gone so far as to
offer bonuses for those who marry.   “Very little research exists to show that91
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marriage promotion programs are effective in creating marriages among low-
income families.”92
Family law, in other words, does not effectively “channel” members of the
underclass into marriage.   Put differently, it does not effectively route the93
underclass to an institution the dominant classes take to be desirable.
In addition, as it applies to the underclass, marriage promotion embodies
policy thinking that is naïve and borders on duplicitous.  If members of the
underclass would only marry, the thinking goes, they would be much more able
to support themselves without government assistance.  If the poor had two-parent
households, they could in fact lift themselves out of poverty.
As Teresa Kominos bluntly stated with reference to this kind of thinking,
“While marriage, in and of itself may be a desirable goal for many members of
the community, it is not a solution to poverty . . . .”   Because Americans tend94
increasingly to marry within class,  we can assume that almost all members of95
the underclass who marry do marry other members of the underclass.  The
coupling of two impoverished people is unlikely to lift them from
impoverishment.  In the present economic setting, the possible husband is
especially likely to be unemployed and, as a result, to be a “bread-eater” rather
than a breadwinner.   Underclass women might also conclude that those96
underclass men with violent tendencies, criminal records, or children with other
underclass women are lousy marital timber.  One careful study used data from the
Fragile Families and Child Well-Being Study to project the earnings and earning
potential of unwed underclass parents if they were married; it concluded that
much of the economic differential between married couples and unmarried
parents can be attributed to factors other than marital status such as
unemployment.   As a result, “[p]roponents of marriage are substantially97
overstating its benefits when they compare the earnings or poverty rates of single
mother families to those of married, two-parent families.”  98
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If marriage promotion laws do not “channel” underclass men and women into
marriage, should we disregard these laws?  If the policy thinking that buoys these
laws is demonstrably faulty, might we simply ignore the laws?  In general, such
dismissive steps would be mistaken because, despite its ineffectiveness and
superficiality, marriage promotion performs an important ideological function.
Indeed, if considered in the bright light of day, this ideological function of
marriage law for the underclass might be neither a residual nor default function,
but rather the most important function.  Built on bourgeois assumptions, the
marriage promotion programs are most certainly normative.  Marriage promotion
programs implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, deplore the poor for their
lifestyles.  The underclass and especially underclass women, this variety of
family law suggests, can make the moral and intelligent choice to marry.  If they
do not make such a choice, they are living in an inappropriate way and are, in
effect, responsible for their own poverty.  Upstanding Americans need not
approve of this easily avoidable, self-imposed poverty, and surely the state
should not have to provide financial support.
III.  CHILD SUPPORT
The faithful and timely payment of child support is potentially as important
to members of the underclass as it is to members of the middle and upper classes.
Child support obligations within the underclass, however, are much less likely
to be part of complicated divorce negotiations and arrangements.  To be sure,
members of the underclass divorce in large numbers.   “Today, first marriages99
are more likely to disrupt in communities with higher male unemployment, lower
median family income, higher poverty and higher receipt of welfare.”   “The100
divorce rate among those who live below the poverty line is just about double
that of the general population.”   However, the lack of income and assets makes101
it unlikely that divorce negotiations will occur, and the majority of underclass
divorces are pro se proceedings that resemble administrative processing.
Furthermore, as suggested in the prior section of this Article, large numbers
of underclass Americans do not marry in the first place, and their children are not
born or raised in the context of marriage.   As a result, child support102
calculations and payments do not take place against the backdrop of divorce.
Mothers have custody of almost all underclass children born out of wedlock, and
perhaps even more so than divorced custodial parents, a never-married mother
would welcome the faithful payment of child support by her child’s father.
But alas, non-custodial parents have hardly distinguished themselves as
reliable payors of child support.  According to United States Census Bureau
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figures for calendar year 2005, only 46.9% of those legally and officially entitled
to child support payments received all of those payments,  and 22.8% received103
no payments at all.   Not surprisingly, census figures do not reference an104
“underclass,” but the figures do indicate that the parts of the population with
characteristics typical of the underclass are the least likely to receive formally
ordered child support.  The percentage of never-married parents receiving no
payments stood at 25.1% and was higher than the percentage of all custodial
parents not receiving any payments.   A striking 28.8% of custodial parents105
without high school diplomas received no payments.   Most tellingly, 27.4% of106
those custodial parents with family income below the poverty line received no
payments, and an additional 33% received only partial and/or irregular
payments.   Lawmakers have been inclined to address delinquency problems107
and, at minimum, to ideologically deplore underclass non-payors. 
For decades, state welfare systems have stumbled along trying to address the
child support delinquency problem.  In all states, delinquent payors can be
prosecuted for failure to pay child support or, in extreme cases, for desertion of
their children.  All states also have enacted some form of the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act, known colloquially as “The Runaway Papa Act.”108
That law provides a process to thwart payors who flee to another state in hopes
of avoiding child support.   States also have a range of measures at their109
disposal for establishing paternity, locating fugitive payors, and enforcing child
support orders through civil actions for attachment and garnishment.110
These traditional options and processes notwithstanding, during the 1980s
the pursuit of delinquent payors acquired a new animus.  The notion of a
“deadbeat dad” took hold with pejorative connotations even greater than those
attached to the “welfare mom.”   Sporting an alliterative lilt, the phrase111
“deadbeat dad” suggested indolent, shiftless, and duplicitous men who probably
should not have fathered children in the first place.  State and local governments
began distributing lists and photos of the “Ten Worst Deadbeats,” and law
enforcement officials attempted to develop a national “most wanted deadbeats
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list.”   Police departments and prosecutors’ offices conducted pre-dawn raids112
and round-ups and in some cases led delinquent payors away in handcuffs while
television crews captured the moment.   Bounty hunters paid with federal113
money set out after delinquent payors on the run.114
In the courts, prosecutors and judges became more inclined toward punitive
treatment of delinquent payors.  One observer argued that the willingness of
judges to jail delinquent payors made payment strikingly more likely.   Judges115
in Genesee County, Michigan, proved especially eager to jail delinquent payors,
and their eagerness allegedly resulted in very high rates of payment.   Judge116
Fred Hazelwood in Manitowoc County, Wisconsin, took an even more
noteworthy step.   He ordered a “deadbeat dad” not to have any more children117
until he could demonstrate he was supporting the nine children he already had.118
The majority of justices on the Wisconsin Supreme Court signed off on
Hazelwood’s order.119
Although an occasional physician or architect might serve as a convenient
poster child for the “deadbeat” dad population, it is difficult not to see the
campaigns against delinquent payors as part of the condemnation of the welfare
system that became increasingly audible during the 1980s.  Delinquent and
irresponsible payors, the argument went, were agents of poverty.  They actually
impoverished their children and the mothers of their children and forced these
mothers and children to turn to the state for support.  What about the many
underclass fathers who themselves were born into poverty and are still living in
poverty?  The building outrage about “deadbeat dads” obscured that reality.
One ambitious ideologue who latched onto the notion that “deadbeat dads”
were causing poverty was Joseph Lieberman, then Attorney General of
Connecticut.  He hurried into print a screed on the need to collect delinquent
child support and the ways to do it.   Lieberman asserted that “the failure of120
delinquent fathers to pay child support is the major reason why more than half
the American families that are headed by a woman live below the poverty
level.”   One chapter in his book discussed “the legal weapons available to121
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mothers.”   Lest he seem too warlike, Lieberman also invoked the loving122
memory of his father Henry Lieberman:  “It is altogether fitting that this book
about what can be done to force delinquent fathers to support their children be
dedicated to a man who was the embodiment of what a responsible father should
be.”123
Judge Hazelwood, Lieberman, and others were state and local officials, but
national figures also spouted ideological pronouncements casting underclass
fathers as disreputable agents of poverty.  These figures included Republican
Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush as well as
Democratic President William Clinton.  The latter promised to “end welfare as
we know it,”  and he did in fact replace the Aid to Families with Dependent124
Children (AFDC) entitlement with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) program.  When President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) into law in 1996, he
explicitly linked welfare reform and child support together.   “For a lot of125
women and children,” Clinton said, “the only reason they’re on welfare
today—the only reason—is that the father up and walked away when he could
have made a contribution to the welfare of the children.”126
The magnitude and range of federal child support legislation enacted since
the mid-1980s are striking, especially because family law has traditionally been
a state concern rather than a federal matter.   In 1984, Congress enacted a new127
round of amendments to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act.   Designed to get128
delinquents to pay up, the amendments directed states to enhance efforts to
collect child support by making available employer withholding, liens against
property, and deductions from tax refunds.129
In 1992, the federal government took even bolder steps to address the
problem of unpaid child support.  Political leaders on both sides of the
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aisle—Republican Congressman Henry Hyde and Democratic Congressman
Charles Schumer, for example—spearheaded the effort to enact the Child
Support Recovery Act (CSRA).   The only opponents of the act were members130
of the nascent fathers’ rights movement.   Some of them questioned the131
assumption that child support delinquency caused poverty and argued that most
of the impoverished families headed by unmarried mothers would not be lifted
out of poverty even if the delinquent fathers somehow paid their child support.132
Having found a convenient whipping boy in the “deadbeat dad,” Congress
ignored the argument. 
The CSRA itself authorized fines and imprisonment for non-custodial parents
who owed child support in one state but lived in another.   However,133
prosecutions under the CSRA suggested the uselessness of the legislation with
regard to obtaining child support from members of the underclass.  Between
October 1992 and February 1999, federal prosecutions resulted in only 105
convictions.   Most notably for purposes at hand, “none of the CSRA cases134
brought to trial involve debts owed to single-mother households where the family
was ‘poor’ before the father left the household.”   In other words, even though135
the CSRA could theoretically be used to address problems of delinquent child
support in all walks of life, it was not.  The great majority of convictions
involved well-to-do fathers who were divorced from the mothers of their children
and owed large amounts of child support.   Members of the underclass, most of136
whom had never married the mothers of their children and who had no
substantial assets, never really became candidates for prosecution.
Congress might have taken note of the small number of prosecutions and the
CSRA’s obvious ineffectiveness as a poverty-reducing measure.  Instead,
Congress decided to stiffen the penalties for offenders who lived in one state and
owed child support in another, and in 1998 President William Clinton signed into
law the menacingly named Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act (DPPA).   It137
amended the CSRA, made offenses under the Act into felonies, and provided that
certain offenders could be imprisoned for up to two years.   The DPPA also138
created the rather remarkable presumption, at least for members of the
underclass, that a delinquent payor is able to pay child support.139
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In addition to criminalizing child support delinquency, the federal
government addressed child support through PRWORA.   Mainstream140
commentaries have stressed the way the legislation replaced welfare entitlements
with various state-designed “welfare-to-work” schemes.   Sometimes141
commentaries overlook PRWORA’s mandate that states take measures to
increase child support collection in order to qualify for federal block grants.  The
measures include, but are not limited to, in-hospital paternity determination,
faster courtroom paternity proceedings, state-wide registration of delinquent
payors, and the denial of licenses to drive, hunt, and engage in assorted
occupations and professional practices.   According to one commentator, the142
new legislation was supposed to make the collection of child support “automatic
and inescapable—‘like death and taxes.’”143
Have the more aggressive child support collection measures enacted and
undertaken since the mid-1980s made payors more faithful to their
responsibilities?  On the one hand, some progress has been made, and the lives
of some custodial mothers and their children have been made easier.  Law, in this
sense, has functioned to bring some parents the payments to which, on behalf of
their children, they are entitled.  On the other hand, almost all of the success has
been with middle and upper class families and not within the underclass.144
Lacking significant effectiveness among the poor, the “deadbeat dad” laws
have only a negligible impact on poverty.  According to Paul K. Legler, “By
itself collecting child support is not a solution to the problem of poverty in single
parent families. . . . If policymakers expect the changes in child support policy
to substitute for cuts in welfare expenditures, they will have sorely missed the
boat.”145
None of this means that child support collection laws and processes have
ceased to be “law” for the underclass.  As was the case with the pro-marriage
legislation and initiatives considered in the previous section of this Article, child
support collection laws and processes rest on debatable assumptions and speak
normatively.  In the eyes of those comfortable Americans who promoted the new
laws and processes, the poor not only fail to respect the institution of marriage
but also fail to satisfactorily support their children.  Those who support these
aggressive child support laws honestly believe that the presumed failure of the
underclass to support their children is wrong and un-American.  Members of the
underclass can be deplored and vilified even if we do not effectively police them.
“Law,” in this sense, is a bourgeois ideological construct.
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IV.  ADOPTION
Commentators on adoption often conceptualize the legal process as
“triangular,” that is, as involving three types of parties:  biological parents,
adoptive parents, and children.   However, there is an even more fundamental146
feature of adoption, one that is grounded in class.  For the most part, “have-nots”
relinquish children to “haves.”  In a majority of adoptions, the “have-nots” are
members of the underclass, and children leave the homes of these biological
parents to become children of their middle and upper-class adoptive parents.  The
class-related nature of the process is manifest for most domestic adoptions and
also for the growing number of inter-country adoptions.147
This class imbalance helps explain why biological parents often experience
and recall adoptions differently than do adoptive parents.  For the latter, adoption
is usually a wonderful development, and adoptive parents customarily feel proud
and enriched.  Underclass parents, by contrast, sometimes experience adoption
in a daze, and they might recall the experience with regret and a great sense of
loss.  It is hard to believe, the underclass biological parent might reflect, but I
was not financially stable enough to hold onto my own flesh and blood.  Other
underclass parents are more clear-headed when placing children for adoption, but
they might feel guilty that they chose to place children for adoption in order to
avoid exacerbating their poverty or becoming dependent on the children’s
fathers.   Adoption law as an ideological construct encourages underclass148
biological parents to think of themselves as failures.
The role of the underclass as the most important “supplier” of adoptable
children became clear during the post-World War II decades, roughly the same
time the modern underclass emerged.  Between the end of the War and 1970, the
number of American adoptions jumped more than threefold from approximately
50,000 to 175,000 annually.   Although in earlier eras the most sought-after149
adoptees might have been young adults who could perform work on family farms
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or in family businesses, infants and toddlers became the preferred adoptees
during the adoption boom.   Adoptive parents were willing to expend150
substantial amounts for healthy youngsters.   Sociologist Vivian Zelizer calls151
this the “sentimentalization of adoption,”  and she speaks of the often poignant152
efforts of middle and upper-class Americans to find “the priceless child.”153
As the demand for adoptees came to exceed the number of available children,
earlier attempts to “match” the ethnicity or race of the child with the ethnicity or
race of the adoptive parents fell by the wayside.   It no longer seemed like much154
of a problem if Norwegian-looking parents adopted a Greek-looking infant.  It
also became acceptable for Caucasians to adopt Native American and African
American children.  According to Elizabeth Bartholet, the Civil Rights
Movement of the 1960s helped prompt transracial adoption by highlighting the
plight of many minority children and by calling for integration.   “This155
movement’s integrationist ideology made transracial adoption a sympathetic idea
to many adoption workers and prospective parents.”156
Some complained about transracial adoptions,  but adoption across race157
became more and more common as the twentieth century limped to a finish.  This
development was significant for the underclass because, as noted earlier,
members of minority groups and especially African Americans constitute a large,
disproportionate percentage of the underclass.   When commentators addressed158
adoption across race, they often unreflectively discussed the adoption of African
American underclass children by members of the Caucasian middle and upper
classes.  Adopted children in most cases move from a poorer, less stable
socioeconomic setting to a more prosperous and stable one.  Some commentators
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use this very socioeconomic “cross-over” to counter those opposed to transracial
adoption.   In Bartholet’s condescending words, “We should not romanticize159
about what it is like to live on the social and economic margins of society.”  160
In general, legal institutions, standards, and processes greatly facilitated these
adoptions.  County welfare departments, non-profit agencies, and private
attorneys are the chief coordinators of adoptions.   Adoptions coordinated by161
private attorneys have become the most rapidly growing variety of adoption.162
When private adoption attorneys are in charge of managing and coordinating
adoptions, middle and upper-class parents, the attorneys’ clients, are most able
to have their preferences accommodated.   County welfare departments and163
non-profit adoption agencies must balance demands from struggling biological
families, state bureaucrats, and organized religious groups; their efforts are less
clearly “client-driven.”164
When attorneys file adoption petitions on behalf of their middle and upper-
class clients with the appropriate court, the standard proceedings include
obtaining consent from biological parents and a judicial consideration of whether
the adoption is in the best interests of the child.  With regard to both of these
matters, those seeking to adopt have substantial advantages.  The controlling
approaches and standards help adoptions move forward to finalization.  American
law, in a sense, wants middle and upper-class Americans to be able to adopt the
available children of the underclass.
The law’s approach to consent from the biological parents is especially
revealing.  Consents from underclass biological mothers are obtained early and
easily, and they are difficult to challenge at a later point in time even if the poor
and poorly educated biological mothers consented hastily.   Courts usually165
require traditional varieties of fraud or duress before they are willing to
invalidate a biological mother’s consent.   Consent prompted by immaturity,166
financial desperation, or pressure from parents and lovers does not constitute
fraud or duress.167
Consents from underclass biological fathers, meanwhile, can be exceedingly
problematic.  As noted in an earlier section of this Article, these fathers are in
many cases not married to the mothers of the children placed for adoption.168
2009] FAMILY LAW FOR THE UNDERCLASS 605
169. See generally Diane S. Kaplan, The Baby Richard Amendments and the Law of
Unintended Consequences, 22 CHILDREN’S LEGAL RTS. J., Winter 2002-2003, at 2 (discussing
putative father registries); Donna L. Moore, Implementing a National Putative Father Registry by
Utilizing Existing Federal/State Collaborative Databases, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1033 (2003)
(advocating for a federal putative father registry).
170. Moore, supra note 169, at 1034.
171. See Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7
J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 324 (1978). 
172. See id.
173. See Tamar Frankel & Francis H. Miller, The Inapplicability of Market Theory to
Frequently, fathers do not live with the biological mothers of their children, and
the whereabouts of some biological fathers are unknown.  How might adoptive
parents and their lawyers obtain consent from these men?  States routinely
authorize constructive notice to these fathers in legal publications with which the
fathers could not possibly be familiar.  Most states have also established so-
called “putative fathers’ registries.”   Men who know or suspect they have169
fathered a child can place their names in the registries and then be notified if and
when the child they think is theirs is placed for adoption.  However, if a man fails
to register, he waives his rights to notice, hearing, and consent.   Many170
underclass fathers, of course, lack the means, mobility, and confidence to
register, and most are unaware of the registries.
The adoption finalization decree, couched with reference to “the best
interests of the child,” also favors the middle and upper-class adoptive parents
over the underclass parents who relinquished or were forced to relinquish their
children.  “Best interests” in the context of adoption is not the same as “best
interests” when two parents are battling for child custody at the time of divorce.
In the latter, the judge might weigh the strengths and weaknesses of one parent
against those of the other in hopes of placing the child in the most nurturing
home.  In the adoption context, by contrast, the judge is not really choosing
between options.  The biological parent or parents have placed the child for
adoption, a caseworker has studied the files and the home of the adoptive parents,
and a government department or non-profit agency has lent its support.  The
determination at this point in the process that the adoption is in “the best interests
of the child” is, for all intents and purposes, a foregone conclusion.  Underclass
parents or, in most cases, unmarried underclass mothers could not hope to
successfully argue that they should keep their children or that parents other than
those who filed the adoption petition would be better picks.
How might one rationalize the frequent and routine adoption of underclass
children by members of the middle and upper classes and the bias on behalf of
the latter in the standard adoption proceeding?  The indefatigable judge and “law
and economics” scholar Richard Posner perceived the fundamental rules of the
market economy asserting or at least attempting to assert themselves.   He urged171
that the market be even further cut loose to get babies whose parents were willing
to place them for adoption into the hands of those most willing to adopt them.172
Posner’s proposals drew criticism,  and Posner, never shy about pimping for the173
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well-to-do and the glories of the market economy, responded with one of his
typically prickly retorts.174
While Posner’s proposals failed to catch hold, a more copasetic
rationalization for the adoption of underclass children by the middle and upper
classes involved a deep-seated disrespect for underclass family life.  As Gilbert
A. Holmes pointed out, the process of American adoption incorporates a clear
preference for the bourgeois nuclear family.   The law takes underclass families175
to be inferior, and “[u]nder nuclear family-based adoption policy, the law
terminates the birth parents’ rights before it engrafts parental rights in the
adoptive parents.”   When children then move to bourgeois nuclear families, the176
law assumes that this move must be good for the children.
To a large extent, these preferences grow out of a larger set of assumptions
regarding parenting and especially mothering.  Most members of the middle and
upper classes hold dear a model of exclusive motherhood.   This intense style177
of mothering first appeared in Europe, and Freud critiqued it as early as the turn
of the twentieth century.   Exclusive mothering and a related normative attitude178
regarding it reappeared in the United States in the 1950s and ‘60s,  and despite179
the many changes in women’s condition since then, the model still has sway.
Even though the majority of middle and upper-class mothers now work outside
the home,  many mothers’ sense of what is required for good mothering remains180
traditional.  The proverbial “Super Mom” somehow finds a way to devote
extraordinary amounts of time to her children.
In her now-classic feminist scholarship, Nancy Chodorow pointed out that
the intense, exclusive style of mothering accepted by middle and upper-class
Caucasians derives from “a socially and historically specific mother-child
relationship.”   For many members of the underclass, by contrast, financial181
necessities and subcultural norms lead parents to share child-rearing
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responsibilities with others, often within extended families.   This approach is182
most evident among African Americans, but it extends to underclass Hispanics,
Native Americans, and Caucasians as well.  Rayna Rapp studied mothering styles
and family structures among the poor in American cities and found “there is a
tremendous sharing of the children themselves.”183
Those committed to exclusive mothering give the underclass community
approach low scores.  Some spokesmen for the dominant classes aggressively
deplore the ways the underclass raises its children along with the lifestyles of the
underclass in general.   Adopting underclass children could, as a result, seem184
an altruistic, even noble undertaking.  Friends and relatives of adoptive parents
often praise them for “saving” underclass children, and some adoptive parents
proudly think of themselves as child-rescuers.185
Attitudes of this sort dwell not only within actual adoption processes and
procedures but also in the culture as a whole.  The cultural bias both prompts and
reinforces the biases within the law regarding underclass parenting and the
adoption of underclass children by middle and upper-class parents.  This
prompting and reinforcement are evident in a wide range of cultural expression.
Hollywood cinema, for example, should never be underestimated as an
ideological organ.  The cinema is, to quote from film theorist Robert B. Ray,
“one of the most potent ideological tools ever constructed.”   Films customarily186
speak in a highly normative way, and the failure or unwillingness of viewers to
perceive this normativity only contributes to its power.   “Any stable society187
will be organised around a preferred self-image. . . . The function of this
representation is to reproduce its own conditions of existence, in other words to
protect the status quo.”188
One example of a contemporary adoption film that incorporates a bias
against underclass parenting and families is the much-praised and star-laden
Losing Isaiah.   Scholars criticized the film for its negative portrayal of African189
American mothering,  but Khaila Richards, the film’s biological mother, is as190
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much a member of the underclass as she is an African American.  Here, as is
often the case in the dominant culture, race serves as a convenient marker for
socioeconomic class.
In the film, the Richards character, played by Halle Berry, conceived Isaiah
during sex-for-drugs intercourse, but she is hardly prepared to be his mother.
Young, addicted, and looking for more drugs, she leaves Isaiah on a trash can.
Fortunately, sanitation workers find him and race him to a hospital.  At the
hospital, a social worker named Margaret Lewin, played by Jessica Lange, helps
Isaiah through his crack-related difficulties, and then she and her husband
Charles, played by David Straithairn, adopt him.  But alas, a rehabilitated
Richards appears wanting her son back.  A series of wrenching personal
exchanges among the characters follow, as do tortuous courtroom proceedings.
Through it all, viewers are invited to side with the Lewins and to reject both
Richards’s attempts to regain her son and Richards herself.  We are horrified
when the judge grants Richards custody.  We flinch when Richards tries to get
Isaiah to eat french fries, gives him a baseball cap he can wear backwards, and
dumps him in daycare.  And we understand when Isaiah pitches a fit and cries for
his “Mommy,” that is, Margaret Lewin.  Toward the end of the film, Richards’
frustrations drive her to the brink of child abuse, and we are immensely relieved
when she turns to Margaret Lewin for help.  It has been obvious to us at every
turn that the bourgeois Lewin would certainly be a better parent than the
underclass Richards.
Whenever middle or upper-class adoptive parents are available and willing,
law, popular culture, and the dominant culture in general tell us these would-be
parents should be allowed to adopt the children of the underclass.  According to
the dominant ideology, underclass children are poised on the junk heap of life.
Their homes are unstable and perhaps unhealthy, and their biological parents do
a lousy job of parenting.  The children will have their best chance to thrive if they
move from their scrambled, underclass families to stable, bourgeois families
typical of the American mainstream.
CONCLUSION
Family law for the underclass is not sui generis.  It performs many of the
same functions family law performs for the middle and upper classes.  It
sometimes channels men and women into marriage.  It sometimes helps parents
obtain the child support to which their children are entitled.  And it sometimes
places children in loving, nurturing adoptive homes.  Political leaders, legislators,
and judges would in most cases be pleased by family law’s ability to function in
these ways, although these government officials might also acknowledge that
family law’s effectiveness with regard to these functions is limited, especially for
the poor.
In addition, family law for the underclass assumes an ideological function.
Buoyed by other ideological pronouncements in the form of political speeches,
religious sermons, and mainstream popular culture, family law implicitly and, in
some instances, explicitly censures the underclass for the way it lives its
collective life.  In particular, marriage promotion laws criticize the underclass for
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its failure to marry and for its disrespect for the very institution of marriage.
“Deadbeat dad” legislation deplores underclass fathers for failing to pay child
support and for ignoring the resulting plight of their children and the mothers of
those children.  Adoption law rejects the way underclass parents raise their
children and is prepared whenever possible to move those children into bourgeois
adoptive homes.  In all of these areas, family law for the underclass suggests
underclass values and conduct—and not the denial of meaningful employment,
educational opportunity, and residential mobility—deposit and keep the
underclass in poverty.
The capacity of family law to function ideologically merits underscoring.
Family law for the underclass plays a major role in designating members of the
underclass as “outsiders” in the United States.  Family law for the underclass
suggests the underclass is a problem in and of itself rather than a sector of the
population unjustly deprived of the material and social sustenance their society
provides others.  In performing this ideological function, family law for the
underclass consigns impoverished Americans to their undesirable situation and,
indeed, helps perpetuate the contemporary American class structure.
